Political and rebel leadership changes in Dagestan

Publication time: 20 October 2007, 19:18

The many changes that have occurred in Dagestan during the past month can only astonish those following the developments in the republic. Most important is the recent change in the leadership of the Dagestan jamaat. The death of Rappani Khalilov, one of the jamaat's leaders and the head of the Dagestan front of the resistance movement, on September 17 (www.lenta.ru, September 17) will undoubtedly have an impact on the jamaat's activity in the near future. The death of a crucial figure like Khalilov does lead to a temporary pause, during which links with various insurgent groups are reestablished and the previous leader's plans are readjusted. Yet this effect will only be temporary because the structure of the movement is such that no one is irreplaceable, including its leadership.

On the orders of Doku Umarov, the slain Khalilov has been replaced by his deputy, Abdul Madzhid (www.kavkazcenter.com, October 1). According to the Chechen resistance leadership, the new emir began his wartime career during the Second Chechen War. His onetime participation in the eastern Chechen front (currently commanded by emir Aslambek Vadalov) suggests that he was trained in Khattab's camps. Even though he was born in Dagestan, Madzhid is closely connected with the men who are fighting nearby in the borderlands of Chechnya, making it possible for him to find support among the Chechens and giving him a definite advantage in his new role as jamaat leader.

The fact that it took Madzhid only ten days to bring order to the resistance cells spread across the republic and receive the oaths of fealty from the many various detachments of the "Shariat" jamaat indicates that he has been able to become the true leader of the organization (www.jamaaatshariat.com, October 11) and that he is respected by the rank and file. While Madzhid was consolidating power, Doku Umarov honored his recently fallen subordinate by granting Khalilov the posthumous rank of general and the "Honor of the Nation" award, the highest decoration bestowed within the resistance movement (www.chechentimes.net, October 3).

Doku Umarov has continued to rehabilitate the reputations of the most radical leaders of the Chechen jamaat. Arbi Baraev, who was killed on June 23, 2001 in Alkhan-Kal, had his rank of brigade general officially restored by one of the presidential decrees signed in October. (His rank had been previously stripped by Aslan Maskhadov for his participation in the 1998 anti-government demonstrations in Gudermes.) Umarov has thus rehabilitated those that Maskhadov and Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev had once declared as the enemies of Ichkeria and the Chechen people. It is well known that the first such decree, "About the Sharia Guard," was issued by Umarov on April 7 (www.kavkazcenter.com, April 28).

It seems that the vice-president of Ichkeria, Supian Abdulaev, is seeking the complete rehabilitation of the radicals, which is altogether understandable, since he, being their representative and protégé in power, must act for the sake of the interests of his party. But, Dokka Umarov is obviously underestimating the consequences of these actions. In trying to recruit for himself a few additional individuals who, for the most part, do not have key roles, he is unintentionally antagonizing those who support the policy of his predecessors - Aslan Maskhadov and Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev. Dokka Umarov should learn from his predecessor's errors and step in the same river twice. In 1997, having won the [Chechen presidential] elections, Aslan Maskhadov, to the great displeasure of many of his supporters, decided to draw the radicals into the government. A series of vitally important posts in the Cabinet of Ministers was given to their [the radicals'] representatives. And, only after the tragic events of the summer of 1998 in Gudermes was Aslan Maskhadov forced to finally break with them. All subsequent attempts to persuade Aslan Maskhadov, and then his successor, Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, to reach an agreement with those who had once challenged the authorities failed. Dokka Umarov has decided to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor and may end up losing the trust of the majority. It should be noted, however, that the majority is apparently penniless, while the (radical) minority has financial injections that may be the impetus behind the Chechen rebel leader's decisions.

Just as there have been changes in the "Shariat" jamaat in Dagestan, there have also been changes in the official ruling elite. The election lists of "Edinaia Rossia" are missing a few famous names, including the millionaire Suleiman Kerimov and Gadzhi Makhachev, a representative of the Avars (the largest ethnic group in Dagestan and the republic's most important political force) who has been a participant in all previous parliaments elected after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the case of Kerimov, it is possible that the obstacle has resulted from business competition, with the pressure coming from Igor Sechin, Vladimir Putin's chief financial ally. Makhachev's absence, on the other hand, is most likely the work of Vladislav Surkov, who has tried to keep individuals with a criminal record out of the party. Makhachev past is well known, since he has been convicted of several severe offenses and was once considered a leader of the Avar criminal groups.

In the government of Dagestan, the removal of Agriculture Minister Rapi Abakarov, Deputy Chief of Staff Dzhaparbeg Shamkhalov, and Secretary of the republic's security council Gitinomagomed Gadzhimagomedov are all directed at increasing the power and influence of the republic's president Mukhu Aliev, who was forced to make concessions upon taking office in order to maintain the balance among the many clans of the republic. Many of the republic's functionaries who answer directly to the president are not particularly important or even politically controversial. These offices are reserved for the most numerous ethnic groups of the republic - Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Laks, and Lezgins. Only if the balance between these groups is broken can one discuss a threat to the stability and order within Dagestan. All other changes are simply a meaningless reshuffling of office holders.

The posts appointed by the Federal authorities-essentially, the Kremlin-are a notable exception and include the Interior Ministry, the Attorney General's office, the local branch of the FSB, the Ministry of Justice, judges of all levels, and those local appointees that need Moscow's confirmation, which include the head of the railroads, airports, etc. Attempts to analyze the changes in the non-Federal appointments (www.gazeta.ru, September 18) are unnecessary, since they attempt to explain phenomena in Dagestan using mechanics that are only applicable to other regions of the country.

Recently, the republic's parliament amended the constitution of Dagestan in order to allow for the parliament, rather than the president, to appoint the speaker of the legislature. This change has been made in order to comply with Federal law (www.gazeta.ru, September 27). While this has nominally removed one of Aliev's powers, it has actually done little to change his authority. The post of speaker is always assigned to an ethnic Dargin, with the power to appoint the speaker being circumscribed by the same ethnic policies that affect the rest of the Dagestan government. As it has been noted previously in "Chechnya Weekly," the presence of several dozen native ethnic groups in Dagestan determines much of the staffing policies and makes any long-range analysis of particular appointments futile.

In light of the overall dissatisfaction with the government of the republic, the voice of the armed opposition is often clearly heard. The blows struck by the insurgents against the security services have become constant and unceasing. The death of Rappani Khalilov, an event that the authorities did not even see fit to present as a grand victory, was viewed as another part of the daily activity of the services and the police. The guerrillas responded with a number of attacks, suggesting that nothing has genuinely changed despite the loss of their leader.

By Mairbek Vatchagaev

Source: The Jamestown Foundation

Kavkaz Center

Dagestan: Opposition Cries Foul Over Elections

Dagestan: Opposition Cries Foul Over Elections

Putin’s party predictably wins in turbulent electoral contest in which two candidates were murdered.

By Diana Alieva in Makhachkala (CRS No. 422 06-Dec-07)

The ruling party, United Russia, won around 90 per cent of the vote in Russia’s parliamentary elections in Dagestan, the biggest autonomous republic in the North Caucasus, which were marred by murder and fraud allegations.

Only one other party, the Communist Party, managed to clear the seven per cent threshold that guarantees seats in the State Duma.

The republic’s electoral commission reported that over 91 per cent of the electorate had voted on December 2. Dagestan’s opposition parties countered that the turnout was minimal, with voters put off by the rainy weather and lack of belief in the electoral process.

This IWPR correspondent, who visited five polling stations in the Dagestani capital Makhachkala, estimated that turnout could not be more than a third. But such observations count for little, as there’s no longer any minimum turnout requirement for elections to be valid.

President Vladimir Putin topped United Russia’s list of candidates nationwide with local leaders following suit and heading local party lists. Dagestani president Mukhu Aliev was the first candidate on United Russia’s electoral list in the north Caucasus republic.

The election in Dagestan, in which around 90 per cent of the vote went to United Russia, was a turbulent affair. In one violent incident, Farid Babyev, a human rights activist and candidate for the liberal Yabloko party, was shot outside his home on November 21 and died of his wounds three days later.

Babayev had been a thorn in the side of the authorities, criticising official corruption and abuse of so-called anti-terrorist operations in the republic.

Commenting on the murder, President Aliev said, “I’d like to repeat that this party [Yabloko] presented no danger to Dagestan’s government. The manner in which leaders of parties like these, who enjoy no broad public support and have to rely on critical and sometime abusive statements, try to attract attention to themselves is offensive.”

Local media criticised the president for making “unethical” comments.

“The phrase would make an unsophisticated reader think that Babayev had tried to assassinate himself,” said the newspaper Svobodnaya Respublika.

Yabloko’s leader Grigory Yavlinsky visited Dagestan after Babayev’s death and managed to hold a press conference, despite efforts to stop him from doing so, in which he lashed out at the authorities.

“Killing a man only because he’s been telling the truth - and what happened to Babayev has nothing to do with either money, business or communal quarrels - is a hideous crime,” said Yavlinsky.

Eduard Khidirov, a local member of the Dagestani parliament, was more outspoken,

“Here, in the republic, they keep on talking about religious extremism, while shutting their eyes to political crimes,” he said. “And the motive for the killing of Farid Babyv is definitely political. The forces that are responsible for the attack on Babayev are seeking to destroy the institutions of elections, opposition and pluralism.”

In another violent incident, on November 26, Nariman Aliev, who was candidate for Russia’s Public Chamber, was shot dead in his own house in the Mamedkala village of Dagestan’s Derbent District.

Throughout the electoral campaign, candidates complained of threats and intimidation.

Leaders of the Communist Party, Liberal Democratic Party and the Just Russia party said they were being pressured to withdraw from the campaign.

Observers and public organisations claimed numerous violations during the voting, including massive rigging by officials in favour of the United Russia party.

Ballot box-stuffing cases were registered at polling stations in Makhachkala, Akushin, Lak, Akhvakh and Untsukul districts. People were seen voting more than once at various polling stations in Derbent. In the Dakhadai district, more than 50 mobile ballot boxes never reached voters.

First Secretary of the Communist Party in Dagestan Makhmud Makhmudov said there had been no elections in the republic.

“Officials adjusted voting results to the figures imposed from above, and votes were not even counted after the opening of ballot boxes at some polling stations,” he said.

On December 3, Magomed Khalitov, chairman of Dagestan’s electoral commission, declared the election had bee free of violations.

On December 4, around 100 members of the local branch of the Communist Party held a rally against the election results in Makhachkala. The protesters carried banners saying “False elections, rotten power” and “Give the election back to the people” and chanted slogans against the local and federal authorities – in particular, against presidents Aliev and Putin.

Political analyst Magomed Akhmednabiev told IWPR, “The results of the election were quite predictable. We are slowly returning to the stagnant Brezhnev rule”.

Gaji Gasanguseinov of the opposition Right Forces Union said the elections had been conducted without the participation of the voters.

“If the turnout had been really as high as the republic’s central election says it was, there would have been a great stir and queues at polling stations. Alas, the polling stations were empty, and there was nothing even for the local television to show.”

Diana Alieva is a correspondent of the Svobodnaya Respublika newspaper.

Source

Troops 'kill' gunmen in Dagestan

Reports from the North Caucasus region of Dagestan say five rebels have been killed by Russian security forces in an operation that is still going on.

Helicopter gunships and mortar crews have been bombarding the gorge near the Chechen border where heavily armed gunmen are believed to be hiding.

The fighting is near the Gimry road tunnel, which has been attacked by militants in the past.

Russian TV described the gunmen as hardened fighters.

Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgerey Magomedtagirov, who is personally leading the operation against them, said the eight included one man on an international wanted list "for an attempt on the life of a law-enforcer".

They were armed with assault rifles, machineguns and grenade launchers and were holding out in a well-equipped bunker, he told Russian television.

The besiegers include spetsnaz commandos and Omon paramilitary police.

Dagestan has seen sporadic attacks on security forces by local Islamist militants, often backed by Chechen fighters.

An invasion of the region by Chechen-led gunmen in 1999 was used by Moscow as part of its justification for sending Russian troops back into Chechnya to oust the separatist government there.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4578152.stm

Dagestan’s Economic Crisis: Past, Present and Future

Dagestan’s Economic Crisis: Past, Present and Future

By Mikhail Roshchin, Vladimir Bobrovnikov

The economy of the republic of Dagestan in the mid-2000s remains in crisis, though the situation has improved from what it was in the 1990s. The planned government-centered economy built up during the Soviet period was destroyed by the shock-therapy market reforms undertaken in Russia during the 1990s. Shipbuilding, aviation, electronics and the nuclear sector of the military-industrial complex were hit particularly hard, declining from their previous position of 85% of the heavy industry to only 15% [1]. In the majority of the mountainous regions (which make up 55% of Dagestan's territory), there are insufficient production assets and social infrastructure, with a lack of employment opportunities, basic living amenities and roads. More than 25% of the overall population is unemployed, a majority of whom are highlanders. 73% of the population lives below the poverty line, while 16% are close to it.

Almost 70% of the main assets within the republic belong to the government. It holds a 56% share in manufacturing, 58% in construction and 88% in agriculture. Through the sale of shares, government property has essentially been divided among the families of the most important officials in the republic, thereby dividing the republic’s main resources – oil, gas and fish. The mayor of Makhachkala, Said Amirov, controls the housing and public transportation market of the capital city via a number of municipal businesses (Chernovik, June 2). The former prime minister, Khizri Shikhsaidov (retired since October 2004), created the "Dagestani Investment Fund" while in office and has used it to bypass the Dagestani and Russian budgets and transfer money from offshore companies. According to President Mukhu Aliev, the shadow economy accounts for roughly 70% of the total economy of the republic. The richest men (bankers, businessmen and others) generally do not pay taxes, and create the most beneficial conditions for themselves through their positions in government at the local or the republican level.

The economy is controlled by ethno-regional groups of influential local oligarchs. The most influential are the "clans" of the former head of the State Council, the Dargin Magomedali Magomedov; the recently elected president (summer 2006), the Avar Mukhu Aliev; and the mayor of Makhachkala, the Dargin Said Amirov (Yuzhnyi Reporter, February 6). Certain opposition leaders have made their way into the government, and, like Gadzhi Makhachev (representing the "Imam Shamil Avar National Front"), have made it into the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Having allied themselves with the rulers of the republic, Makhachev became the CEO of the large "Rosneft-Dagneft" corporation (formed in 1994), which he heads to this day.

Other opposition leaders that have used business as a springboard to governmental posts have been destroyed. Such victims include the head of the "Elbrin" bank and the economic minister of the republic, the Dargin Gamid Gamidov and the former leader of the "Kazi-Kumukh" Lak national movement Magomed Khachilaev, who headed the republic's fish concern "Dagryba" in the late 1990s. On April 17th, 2005 Sharaputdin Musaev, the head of the "Dargin mafia" of Kaspiisk and the former head of the Dagestani pension fund, was shot down in Moscow. Musaev's name is tied to the theft of 43 million rubles (US$1.6 million) from the pension fund in 1998.

Another feature of the Dagestani economy has been its need for subsidies, with 78.8% of the republic's budget coming from federal funds (Chernovik, July 1, 2005). A recent inquiry by Dmitry Kozak has shown that Dagestan is costing the Russian government too much money, yet in 2007, the republic will receive the largest set of federal subsidies in the country – 483,134,200 rubles ($18,086,792) drawn from the Fund for Regional Development (Dagestan News agency, August 25). Roughly 59% of the republic's budget is earmarked for paying salaries and financing social development, but 70-80% of these funds are actually stolen.

The degree of economic decline in Dagestan should not be overemphasized [2]. A certain stabilization of the economy was already noticeable in 1999, and during the last 5-6 years manufacturing has grown by 2.8 times, light manufacturing has increased by 57.2%, and the wine industry by 40%. Dagestan produces roughly a quarter of Russia's brandy, and 14% of its wine (www.e-dag.ru). Small business is growing (with over 2,000 companies), with 41% of such businesses being devoted to trade, 20% to construction, 17% to manufacturing, 12% to the service industry, 5% to agriculture, 3% to transport, and 2% to communications.

47.9% of the republic's GDP comes from the service industry and the market of consumer goods, while 15.5% is derived from manufacturing and 8.9% from construction. Nine folk-craftsman manufacturing plants are in operation in the mountain and foothill regions, including the famous Kubachin factory for rug production. Agriculture remains a crucial branch of the economy, accounting for 25.5% of the republic's economy and employing a third of all of the republic's workers. More than 900 agricultural enterprises have been registered, along with 36,000 individual farmer's (peasant) households. Private agricultural production provides more than 67% of the total output of such products as potatoes, fruits, vegetables, and berries. Poultry production is the most profitable, with the animal stocks of poultry-producing enterprises growing from 93.1% to 168% over the last six years. The profit margins in livestock and winemaking are even lower, with enterprises showing only a growth of 31% and 17.1% respectively. The development of agriculture is limited by the worn out machinery (up to 70% of the total) and other tools, insufficient investment, and competition from imports.

A sizable potential for economic growth rests in the energy sector. Experts believe that Dagestan has 161 million tons of oil and gas condensate reserves (10.4 million are already explored) and up to 155 billion cubic meters of natural gas (44 billion cubic meters in known deposits). Industrial oil production near the city of Izberbash began in 1936 and peaked in 1970 (with 2.2 million tons), but dropped subsequently due to the exhaustion of the Yuzho-Sukhokum deposit (to 400,000 tons). Natural gas extraction is more stable, having reached 890 million cubic meters per year due to the development of the Dimitrov deposits. The largest energy production company is "Dagnefteprodukt" (accounting for more than 500,000 cubic meters). It is based around a pre-revolutionary oil-processing center created in Makhachkala in 1888. Instead of processing diesel, motor oils, and aviation fuel coming from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, as it did in the Soviet period, this enterprise has recently switched to processing Russian oil and gasoline being shipped to Iran via the Caspian Sea [3].

Dagestan remains an important transport hub for southern Russia. The Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline (274 km), Mozdok-Kazimagomed (297 km) and Makat-North Caucasus (129.4 km) gas pipelines stretch across the republic, providing 36.8% of its tax revenue. The port of Makhachkala processes more than 1.2 million tons of cargo and 3.3 million tons of oil products annually. The economy of the republic depends on imports, receiving more than 75% of its grain, 80% of its flour, and 64% of its meat from other regions of the Russian Federation. Most imports arrive (as in the past) from Azerbaijan (with 88% of the total), with other goods and raw materials coming from Iran and Turkey. The republic's exports generally consist of raw materials and include brandy and wine, meat and wool, and canned fruits, vegetables and fish. The republic has 7,858 km of roads, of which 649 km are federal highways, as well as 1,190 km of railroads. 130,000 passengers are carried annually by air transport, with the movement of cargo and passengers being generally carried out by Russian companies (83% of all passengers, 40% of the cargo, 96% of the postal cargo).

Along with goods, sizable investment capital flows into Dagestan from Russia. Among the twelve regions of the Southern Federal District of the Russian Federation, Dagestan has the most lending institutions, and is the fifth most capitalized region. While in the mid-1990s private banks came to monopolize this industry, most of them were swept away by the 1998 default. Today, several dozen small, private banks exist in the republic along with Russia's "Sberbank," with 41 such institutions occupying places ranging from 24 to 139 in the list of the most important banks of the Southern Federal District [www.rating.rbc.ru]. 55% of the market for consumer lending belongs to the "Eno" bank, 21% to "Andzhibank," and 12% to the "Bank of Izberbash," though lending tends to be very short term. Three Dagestani banks provide credits to Dagestani businessmen working in Moscow (34.7 million rubles of credits in 2003), Moscow oblast (8.9 million rubles), and Northern Ossetia (12.3 million), though 75% of all credits issued within Dagestan come from banks outside the republic [5].

In conclusion, the degree of Dagestan’s economic decline poses tremendous problems for the future wellbeing of the republic. Although its economic situation has improved somewhat since late 1990’s, many underlying problems remain to be resolved, chief among them the rampant corruption that consistently undermines any attempts to improve the local economy there. Until that happens, the recovery taking place there will remain slow, as its economic future will remain highly dependent on the underground economy and the subsidies coming from the central Russian government. By doing so, any real chance of achieving a higher level of autonomy remains bleak as the current economic crisis will continue to cloud the future of the Dagestani highlands.

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2372620